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In calculating the taxable income of a taxpayer, items of income and expenditure 
are classified as being either capital or revenue in nature, and are treated 
differently according to such classification. 
Over the years, a debate has emerged regarding the classification of items of 
income that are either part of the ground or accede to it, but which are treated by 
the taxpayer as trading stock.  The debate extends to the classification of items 
of expenditure laid out in the production of income and for the purposes of trade, 
but which relate to land or things adhered to land. Items forming the subject 
matter of the discussion include sand, stone, coal, trees and other plants to be 
used not for the sale or use of their fruit, but for  sale or use themselves. 
The debate stems from the basic principle that land is a capital asset and the 
argument, based on the law of things, that land includes things adhered to it by 
way of accession.  The problem is that items of trading stock are treated as 
revenue assets, and concerns have been expressed around the classification of 
assets as revenue while, in the law of things, they are considered an inseparable 
part of a capital asset. 
In this work it will be shown that there is no compelling reason to depart from the 
ordinary test which is trite in our tax law.  The test applied in the determination of 
the classification of an asset for tax purposes is the intention of the taxpayer with 
regard to the income or expenditure, taking into account the nature of his 
business and the manner in which he deals with the asset. It will be shown that 
parts of land (for example coal or sand) or items attached to it (for example 
trees) that are used by the taxpayer as trading stock, can (and indeed should) be 
labelled as revenue for income tax purposes, notwithstanding the fact that they 












In order to standardise the practical application of the law and to fill in the gaps 
which presently exist, I would propose that the current legislation be amended in 
certain respects, which I outline below. 
2. CURRENT POSITION OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW  
 
2.1. Capital / Revenue Classification 
 
Gross income, being the point of departure from which taxable income is 
calculated, excludes ‘receipts or accruals of a capital nature’.1  Furthermore, 
expenditure and losses ‘not of a capital nature’ are deductable from a taxpayer’s 
income in the calculation of taxable income.2
Nowhere in the Act is the meaning of the word ‘capital’ defined.  As such, in the 
determination of taxable income our courts have gone to great lengths to 
distinguish capital assets or expenditure from revenue assets or expenditure.  
What follows is a brief discussion on the reported cases dealing with this 
distinction in relation to items that form part of land or are adhered to land. 
  It is critical therefore, that income 
and expenditure be classified as being of a capital nature or not (in which case 
they are revenue in nature) for the purpose of the said calculation.  
 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v George Forest Timber Co Ltd3
In this case the taxpayer, a timber merchant, purchased forested land and felled 
and worked the trees in its sawmill for sale as logs.  The court considered first 
whether the proceeds of the sale of the logs from the forest were receipts of a 
capital or revenue nature, and second whether a proportional cost of the forest 
 
                                                          
1  Definition of ‘gross income’ in Section 1 of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962 (hereafter 
referred to as “the Act”). 
2  Section 11 of the Act. 












bought by the taxpayer was deductable from the proceeds as being of a revenue 
nature.   
On the first question, the court found that the proceeds of the sale of the logs 
were part of the company’s revenue as received in the course of its business4. 
On the second question, however, it found that a proportion of the cost was not 
deductable from the proceeds.  As the basis for the latter finding, Innes CJ held 
that: ‘[the trees] formed part of the realty to which they acceded, and they 
passed with it.’ 5
In summary then, proceeds from the sale of trees by a plantation farmer are 
revenue in nature because they are intended to be sold in the course of his 
business. Their cost is, however, not deductible as they are one with the capital 
asset to which they are attached. 
  
 
Crowe v Commissioner for Inland Revenue6
Here, the taxpayer, a wattle farmer, presold a wattle plantation in order to raise 
finance for the purchase of the land on which the plantation stood.  Following the 
same route as the court in George Forest Timber, the court considered first 
whether the amount received on the presale of the plantation was a receipt of a 
capital nature and if not, whether the cost of the plantation was deductable from 
such receipt.   
 
The court found that the proceeds merely represented the realisation of a capital 
asset and were not made in the course of the taxpayer’s business.  In this case 
the court emphasised that the taxpayer sold the plantation without planting and 
cultivating it, but merely in order to raise the purchase price for the rest of the 
                                                          
4  At 525 












land on which he would then commence farming.  As such, his conduct which 
was of importance was his speculation on the plantation, and not his farming of 
it in the course of his business.   
Thus, a farmer who speculates on the sale of trees (as distinguished from 
farming them in the course of his business) realises part of his capital asset and 
the proceeds of the speculation are capital in nature. 
 
Baikie v Commissioner for Inland Revenue7
In this case, the taxpayer, a wattle farmer, sought to deduct a proportional cost 
of his plantation from his income on the basis that it was expenditure actually 
incurred in the production of his income and not of a capital nature.  
 
The court dealt only with the second question faced by the courts in George 
Forest Timber and Crowe (because the CIR had already treated the Appellant’s 
income from the plantation as revenue). Applying George Forest Timber, it held 
that since the plantation was accessory to the land, its cost was not capable of 
being separated from that of the land for the purposes of claiming a deduction 
from gross income.  In that case the court confirmed the summarisation of the 
court a quo of the finding of George Forest Timber as: 
‘…; 
(2) “… when land has been acquired with trees and other accessories thereon for 
the purpose of obtaining an income from the trees and accessories, the acquisition 
of the trees cannot be divorced from the acquisition of the land.”’8
 
 
The principle to be extracted follows George Forest Timber, being that the cost 
of a plantation is not a deductible expense as the trees are inseparable from the 
capital asset to which they are attached.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
6  1930 AD 122 
7  1931 AD 496 













Matla Coal Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue9
Here, the court considered the question of whether the proceeds from the sale 
of coal rights by the taxpayer were of a capital nature.   
 
On the evidence, it was held that the taxpayer was not in the business of selling 
coal rights for profit.  It was a coal mining company for its own right, and mining 
rights were not its stock in trade.   
Thus, where a coal mining company speculates in coal rights (as distinguished 
from mining coal in the course of its business), the proceeds are capital. 
The court, however, went further and stated obiter that:  ‘…coal itself can only 
be regarded as stock-in-trade and become the subject matter of a sale in the 
course of a business once it is separated from the land of which it forms part, 
i.e. is mined.’10
 
 Notwithstanding its obiter status, this statement has fuelled the 
debate which is discussed in detail below. 
Bourke’s Estate v Commissioner for Inland Revenue11
In this case, the court dealt with the classification of an amount received by the 
taxpayer as compensation for the loss of a pine plantation destroyed by fire.   
 
In his discussion regarding the nature of fixed [capital] (capital) as opposed to 
floating capital (revenue), Hoexter JA held that:  
 
‘[t]he labelling of capital in either category at a given time and in a 
particular situation does not import any ingrained character, incapable of 
fluctuation, to the capital involved.  The immutability of the nature of 
                                                          
9  1987 (1) SA 108 (A) 
10  At 128G 












capital is neatly put by Swinfen Eady J in the Ammonia case supra at 
28712
“It must not, however, be assumed that the division into which capital thus falls is 
permanent. The language is merely used to describe the purpose to which it is for 
the time being appropriated”.   
 in the following words:  
Second, what must be steadily borne in mind is that the assignment of 
capital to the one or the other category  
“… depends in no way upon what may be the nature of the asset in fact or in law. 
Land may in certain circumstances be circulating capital. A chattel or a chose in 
action may be fixed capital.  The determining factor must be the nature of the trade 
in which the asset is employed.  The land upon which a manufacturer carries on his 
business is part of his fixed capital.  The land on which a dealer in real estate carries 
on his business is part of his circulating capital”.’13
 
   
Having regard to the facts of the case, he continued as follows: 
‘The argument for the appellants focuses in the main on the legal nature 
of the asset for which compensation was paid (the pine trees standing on 
the property and, prior to felling, adhering thereto). Now it is trite that the 
planting of land and the taking root thereon provides an example of 
industrial accession. The trees are incorporated into the soil which 
nurtures them. But here the enquiry relates not to the legal status, in the 
law of things, of the crop on the property, but exclusively to the nature of 
the business carried on … in relation to such pine trees. [The appellants] 
farmed with the pine trees in order to derive income therefrom.’14
The court found that the fact that the trees adhered to the land and would only 
produce income once felled was irrelevant, and that the pine trees constituted 
floating capital as much before as after felling. It held therefore that the 
compensation in respect of the unfelled trees was not of a capital nature.
  
15
In summary,  
 
                                                          
12  Ammonia Soda Co Ltd v Chamberlain [1918] 1 CH 266 (CA) 286 
13  At 672H  
14  At 673C 
15  The court went on to distinguish the facts of Bourke’s Estate from those present in 
George Forest Timber, Crowe and Baikie.  The distinctions are, with respect, 
somewhat lacking in particularity.  As will be discussed later, however, the relevant 
principle in these cases is, since the advent of the provisions of Schedule 1 to the 












1. The capital/revenue classification of a thing does not change the 
ingrained character of that thing, and merely describes the purpose for 
which it is for the time being appropriated; and 
2. Compensation from the destruction of trees from which the farmer 
intended to earn an income, is revenue; and 
3. This is the case even though the trees were destroyed while still being 
attached to the ground.   
 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Van Blerk16
Here, the court considered whether proceeds from the sale by the taxpayer of 
rights to mine sand on the farm which he otherwise used for purposes of 
farming, was capital or revenue.   
 
The court, ignoring the distinction between the sale of sand and the sale of a 
right to remove sand, found that the question is not whether the sand is corpus 
or fructus of the land, but what the taxpayer’s intention was with regard to such 
sale within the context of the nature of his business.   
The court held that the land was used for a dual purpose, being trading in sand 
and farming, and that the proceeds were therefore revenue.  Relying on 
Bourke’s Estate, the court formulated the test thus:  
                                                          












‘The proceeds of the sand are not to be determined by whether the fruits 
or corpus has been sold, but rather by means of an examination of the 
nature of the transactions and the intentions with which they were 
undertaken by the taxpayer.’17
and 
 
 “The enquiry relates not to the legal classification of the thing sold, that is 
whether it is part of the corpus or constitutes a sale of fructus, but 
exclusively to the nature of the business carried on by [the taxpayer] in 
relation to such sand.’18
Thus, the intention of a farmer with regard to the sale of sand, within the context 
of the nature of his business, is paramount in deciding whether the proceeds of 
the sale are capital or revenue. Where he intends to sell sand in the course of 
his business of trading sand, the proceeds are revenue. 
 
 
Samril Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner, SARS19
Here, the taxpayer earned income from the sale of sand on its farm. It had 
previously earned an income through rental for grazing and for the sale of farm 
produce.  
 
The court was faced with the question of whether payment for the right to mine 
sand was of a capital or revenue nature, its primary question being whether the 
receipt constituted a gain made pursuant to a scheme of profit-making.  It 
applied the dictum of Smalberger JA in CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employees Share 
Purchase Trust, 20
                                                          
17  At 1020 C 
 to the extent that a revenue receipt or accrual was ‘not 
18  At 1021 F 
19  2003 (1) SA 658 SCA 












fortuitous but designedly sought and worked for’.21
Thus, proceeds from the sale of sand earned pursuant to a scheme of profit-
making, are revenue. 
   On this basis the court 
found the proceeds of the sale of sand to be of a revenue nature. 
In summary, the law as pronounced by the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court (or the Supreme Court of Appeals as it is called today) is as follows: 
1. Income in the form of the proceeds of an asset, are classified with reference 
to the nature of the transactions and the intention of the taxpayer in 
undertaking them within the context of his business. By way of example: 
1.1. Proceeds from the sale of logs by a timber merchant are revenue in 
nature;22
1.2. Proceeds of the sale of trees by a farmer speculating but not farming 
them constitutes the realisation of a capital asset;
 
23
1.3. Proceeds received by a coal mining company for the sale of coal rights 
(as opposed to coal itself) are not revenue in nature;
 
24
1.4. Compensation for the loss of unfelled trees to be used for sale once 
felled is revenue in nature;
 
25
                                                          
21  At 57 E 
 and 
22  George Forest Timber case supra 
23  Crowe case supra 
24  Matla Coal case supra 












1.5. Proceeds from the sale of sand by a farmer, that are earned as part of a 
scheme of profit-making, are revenue in nature;26
2. Trees in a plantation that are to be sold once felled are revenue in nature 
even while adhered to the land; 
 and 
27
3. Since trees form part of the land (capital) to which they adhere, their cost is 
not a deductible expense.
but 
28
2.2. Criticism of authorities 
 Today, this aspect is of academic value only, 
which is discussed in more detail below. 
 
It is argued that, since trees form part of the land to which they adhere, they 
cannot be considered to be trading stock in the hands of a plantation farmer.29
The idea that trees form part of land stems from the law of things in terms of 
which a thing that accedes to land is considered one with the land for purposes 
of determining ownership. 
 In 
support, reliance is made on the finding in George Forest Timber that the cost 
of trees is not a deductible expense because trees form part of the land. Further 
reliance is made on the obiter dictum of Corbett JA in Matla Coal that ‘coal can 
only be regarded as trading stock … once it is separated from the land of which 
it forms part’. 
This criticism, as well as the pronouncements on which it is based, calls for an 
examination of the relevant legal principles contained in the law of things and an 
analysis of their applicability in tax law.  
                                                          
26  Samril Investments case supra 
27  George Forest Timber case supra 
28  George Forest Timber and Baikie cases supra 
29  TS Emslie SC in Emslie, Davis, Hutton & Olivier Income Tax Cases and Materials 












2.3. Law of Things  
 
The South African law of things stems from Roman law and Roman-Dutch law.  
The Roman law maxim omne quod implantatur solo cedit was expanded on by 
Roman-Dutch writers.  Voet defined the word ‘accession’ as ‘a method of 
acquiring ownership by which a thing becomes another’s because it accedes 
to a more principle thing of that other’30
‘Things planted and sown go with the ground on the analogy of things 
built on other things, provided that the things so planted have struck 
roots.  This is because it is fair that a plant should belong to him from 
whose ground it is fed through the roots’
  (my emphasis). He goes further to say: 
31
Van Leeuwen stated that: 
 (my emphasis). 
‘1. Accession per consequentiam rei is where two substances, being 
united together, the more valuable carries with it the less valuable, or 
inferior, by reason of the form-giving commixion.   
2. Accordingly whatever is inseparably built or sown on another’s land, is 
held to belong to the owner of the soil: …’32
Huber stated that: 
 (my emphasis). 
‘17. …, [T]rees which are planted on another’s ground become the 
property of the owner of the ground, not, however, before they have 
struck roots into the ground; both because they become an accession to 
the ground, and because the tree, drawing its food from another’s 
ground, gradually derives its whole body from the nourishment in the 
ground, out of which it is fed. …  
20. Such is the law that we use in regard to the ownership, …’33
                                                          
30  Voet Commentary on the Pandects XL 6.1.1.14 
 (my 
emphasis). 
31  Voet Commentary on the Pandects XL 6.1.1.15 












In South African law, accession, and more specifically planting and sowing, is 
dealt with as an original mode of acquisition of ownership and only dealt with in 
such context:  
 ‘Accession takes place when two corporeal things or parts of things 
(usually a principal and an accessory thing) are combined either through 
human activities or natural processes in such a way that the one thing or 
part of a thing loses its physical or economic dependence and becomes a 
component of another thing.  The thing which remains essentially 
independent is called the principal thing, while the thing which is merged 
or combined in such a way that it loses its independence, is called the 
accessory thing.  The owner of the principal thing becomes the owner 
of the new thing by operation of law without him necessarily being aware 
of the accession’34
‘Plantatio et satio is the process through which growing things accede to 
the land and become the property of the landowner’
 (my emphasis). 
35
 ‘Planting and sowing is the process whereby growing moveable things 
are attached to the land and become the property of the landowner. 
Everything growing on the soil becomes part of the land as soon as its 
takes root and gets nourishment from the soil’
 (my emphasis). 
36
‘According to Voet “[t]hings planted and sown go with the ground … 
provided that the things so planted have struck roots”.  In other words, if 
a person has planted his seeds or saplings of young trees and the like, 
on another’s land, their ownership is vested in the owner of that land as 
soon as they have taken root, although the person who has planted them 
may have a claim for compensation against the owner
 (my emphasis). 
37
‘Ingevolge die Romeinsregtelike reël omne quod implantatur solo cedit 
wat die Romeins-Hollandse in Suid-Afrikaanse reg oorgeneem is, vorm 
alles wat in die grond geplant of gesaai is, deel van die grond. Sodra saad 
wat in die grond gesaai is, ontkiem en sodra plante wat in die grond 
 (my emphasis). 
                                                                                                                                                                    
33  Huber The Jurisprudence of my Time 1.2.17, 20 
34  AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar, Introduction to the Law of Property 4 Ed (2002) 
118 
35  DL Carey Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 20 
36  AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar, Introduction to the Law of Property 4 Ed (2002) 
120 












geplant is, wortels skiet, vorm hulle ‘n eenheid met die grond en behoort 
hulle aan die eienaar van die grond’38
So, for purposes of the determination of ownership, it is settled in our law that 
things planted on land and drawing nourishment from land are considered the 
property of the landowner. 
 (my emphasis). 
It is now important to decipher the purpose of the law of things so that it is not 
given an application for which it is inappropriate.   
‘The law of things operates in three spheres.  First, it strives to harmonize 
various competing ownership rights especially between neighbouring 
landowners.  Harmony is achieved by applying the rules of neighbour law; 
thus no one is allowed to exercise his rights of ownership in such an 
unreasonable way that he derives no benefit from them whilst his 
neighbour suffers unproportionate prejudice because of his activities.  
Secondly, the law of things endeavours to harmonize the rights of an 
owner with regard to his property vis-à-vis the rights of holders of limited 
real rights, possessors and detentors.  This is done by restricting the 
number and the content of limited real rights and by giving preference to 
owners vis-à-vis possessors and detentors, subject to the institutions of 
prescription and estoppel. Thirdly, the law of things controls the 
exchange of things and real rights.  It controls the transfer of things or 
real rights from one person to another and settles conflicting claims 
between, for instance, the former owner and a subsequent bona fide 
purchaser.’39
Accordingly, the law of things fulfils an essential function.  It determines rights of 
ownership and makes for easier regulation of relations between persons in 
respect of property. Whether it is appropriate for purposes of the classification 
and labelling of assets for tax purposes is an entirely separate issue, which will 
be explored later. 
 
 
                                                          
38  CG van der Merwe, Sakereg 2 Ed (1989) 245 













2.4. Trading Stock 
 
If an asset is dealt with as revenue, it is understood to be an item of trading 
stock. In the same way, items of trading stock are classified as revenue assets. 
The classification of an asset as trading stock also has tax consequences 
because trading stock has to be accounted for at the beginning and end of each 
tax year. Thus it becomes important to understand the concept of trading stock 
in attempting to provide a practical solution to the debate around assets forming 
part of or adhered to land. 
Trading stock is defined in the Act as:  
‘(a) anything – 
(i) produced, manufactured, constructed, assembled, 
purchased or in any other manner acquired by a taxpayer 
for the purposes of manufacture, sale or exchange by him 
or on his behalf; or 
(ii) The proceeds from the disposal of which forms or will form 
part of his gross income, …; or  
(b) any consumable stores and spare parts acquired by him to be 
used or consumed in the course of his trade, …;’ 
Section 11(a) of the Act allows for the deduction of expenditure and losses 
actually incurred in the production of income, provided that they are not of a 
capital nature, from a taxpayer’s taxable income. Thus expenditure incurred in 
the purchase of trading stock is deductible from gross income. 
Section 22 of the Act, entitled ‘Amounts to be taken into account in respect of 












‘22(1) The amount which shall, in the determination of taxable income 
derived by any person during any year of assessment from 
carrying on any trade (other than farming), be taken into account 
in respect of the value of any trading stock held and not disposed 
of by him at the end of such year of assessment [referred to in 
practice as ‘closing stock’], shall be –  
(a) In the case of trading stock other than trading stock 
contemplated in paragraph (e), the cost price to such person 
of such trading stock, less such amount as the Commissioner 
may think just and reasonable as representing the amount by 
which the value of such trading stock, …, has been diminished 
by reason of damage, deterioration, change in fashion, 
decrease in the market value or for any other reason 
satisfactory to the Commissioner; and … 
22(2) The amounts which shall, in the determination of taxable income 
derived by any person during any year of assessment from 
carrying on any trade (other than farming) be taken into account in 
respect of the value of any trading stock held and not disposed of 
by him at the beginning of any year of assessment [referred to in 
practice as ‘opening stock’], shall – 
(a) If such trading stock formed part of the trading stock of such 
person at the end of the immediately preceding year of 
assessment be the amount which was, in the determination of 
the taxable income of such person for such preceding year of 
assessment, taken into account in respect of the value of such 
trading stock at the end of such preceding year of 
assessment; or 
(b) If such trading stock did not form part of the trading stock of 
such person at the end of the immediately preceding year of 
assessment, be the cost price to such person of such trading 
stock.’ 
‘22(4) If any trading stock has been acquired by any person for no 
consideration or for a consideration which is not measureable in 
terms of money, such person shall, for the purposes of subsection 
(3) be deemed to have acquired such trading stock at a cost equal 
to the current market price of such trading stock on the date on 












The words ‘taken into account’ are not spelled out in the Act (in comparison to 
the words ‘included in income’ found in Schedule 1 which deals with farming). 
The problem is that closing stock is not a ‘receipt or accrual’ and can thus not be 
included in income in terms of Section 1, and opening stock cannot be deducted 
in terms of Section 11(a) because it was incurred in a previous year.  It is argued 
that the figures are ‘taken into account’ by way of an adjustment to taxable 
income40
This adjustment is presumably envisaged to ensure that the Receiver is able to 
asses and tax the taxpayer on the total value of his business, including the stock 
that he holds at year end and intends to sell in the following years. If he is not 
made to do so, a taxpayer can use all his profits to purchase stock just before 
the year end and in so doing, deflate his profit figures for tax purposes. It thus 
becomes important to classify assets adhered to land or forming part of land as 
trading stock or not, so that such adjustments can be made accordingly. 
 by adding the value of his trading stock at the fiscal year end to his 
income for that year and deducting the value of his opening stock from such 
figure at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Paragraph 12(2)(c) of the eighth schedule  to the Act (which deals with capital 
gains tax) provides that where assets are held by a taxpayer otherwise than as 
trading stock and are then commenced to be held by him as trading stock, they 
are deemed to have been disposed of by him at that point for a sum equal to 
their market value (which is treated as an accrual) and immediately reacquired at 
an expenditure equal to the market value (which is treated as having actually 
been incurred for the purposes of paragraph 20(1)(a)).  Thus, where an asset is 
not included in a taxpayer’s closing stock because it was regarded by him as a 
capital asset, a deemed cost equal to its market value is taken into account as 
an opening stock figure at the date on which he forms the intention to use it as 
trading stock (in terms of section 22(3)(a)(ii)). 
                                                          












In Richards Bay Iron & Titanium (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR,41
In Ernst Bester Trust v CSARS,
 the court held 
that the first part of the definition of trading stock (as it then was and which is 
substantially the same as the present part (a)(i)) includes articles not saleable or 
contemplated for sale in their then state. 
42 the court held that income from sand 
removed from a farm constitutes revenue as it was ‘made in the operation of an 
ongoing scheme of profit-making’ as the result of a ‘contractual relationship 
designed for that purpose’.43  The court then considered whether the taxpayer 
was entitled to an opening stock deduction in respect of the sand. The court 
held that, since Section 22 of the Act provides for ‘stock held and not disposed 
of’, it has no bearing on stock that is acquired and wholly disposed of in the 
same year.44 Since it was the taxpayers case that the sand only constituted 
trading stock once separated from the land and since it was common cause that 
it was disposed of immediately once separated (or at least within the same year), 
the court found that the taxpayer was not entitled to an opening stock deduction 
in terms of section 22.45
In ITC12463, the tax court considered the status of stockpiles of phosphate-
bearing ore. It was common cause that the phosphate-bearing ore had not been 
acquired for purposes of sale
   
46 or exchange so the court had to decide the 
narrow question of whether it had been acquired ‘for the purpose of 
manufacture’ so as to be included within the definition of trading stock.47
                                                          
41  1996 (1)SA 311 (A) 
 The 
court drew a distinction between manufacturing and mining and held that, where 
minerals are extracted without a different product emerging (as with phosphate-
bearing ore), the process constituted mining.  As a result, the stockpiles of 
42  2008 (5) SA 279 (SCA) 
43  At 284G 
44  At 288A 
45  At 288D 
46  It is interesting that the parties considered it common cause that the ore had not 
been acquired for the purposes of sale in light of the finding made in the Richards 
Bay case supra. 












phosphate-bearing ore were not acquired ‘for the purpose of manufacture’ and 
therefore not trading stock within the first part of the definition. 48  The court held 
further that, since it was not amenable to being disposed of for value (was not in 
a realisable state), the stockpile did not fall into the second part of the definition 
either.49
As is evident, the classification of items forming part of land or adhered to land 




3.1. Main hypothesis 
 
My view is that the use of the law of things, and more specifically the rule that 
items attached to land are one with the land, as shown above for purposes of the 
determination of ownership, is an inappropriate mechanism for use in the 
determination of the capital or revenue nature of assets and their labelling and 
treatment as such.  Tax law does not use ownership as a basis of any 
characterisation.  It looks at the intention of the taxpayer with regard to such 
asset and within the context of his business in the determination of its 
classification. The argument that, because trees are considered one with the 
land for purposes of ownership, they must, irrespective of the intention of the 
taxpayer (who is in any event usually the undisputed owner of both), be labelled 
as capital assets, is thus unnecessary and artificial.   
In the law of taxation, the intention or purpose of the taxpayer is of paramount 
importance with regard to the classification of income and expenditure, as well 
as of trading stock.50
                                                          
48  At paragraph 29 
  The intention test is a subjective one and is decided taking 
49  At Paragraph 31 
50  There are some cases in which the word ‘intention’ is distinguished from the word 












into account all the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of, and the 
method of dealing with, the asset. 51
In CIR v Stott, 
  
52 the court held that, in the determination of the nature of 
income, the intention of the taxpayer on the date of acquisition of the asset was 
of importance.  It explained that unless he showed that, when sold, the asset 
was sold as part of a scheme of profit making (so there had been a change of 
intention since its purchase), the initial intention of the taxpayer was conclusive. 
53
In Natal Estates Ltd v SIR,
  
54
Similarly, with regards to the enquiry as to the nature of income, it is clear that 
the courts in the cases cited in part 2.1 relied on the intention of the taxpayer in 
making their determination. 
 the court faced a situation where a taxpayer had 
purchased land for use as farming and then embarked on a scheme of 
subdividing it and selling it to make a profit. The court held that his conduct of 
embarking on such a scheme in which he used the land as stock-in-trade 
showed that the taxpayer had changed his intention and thus `crossed the 
Rubicon’. The court held that, as at the date of his change of intention, his land 
constituted a revenue asset. 
The intention of the taxpayer is also of paramount importance in determining the 
nature of expenditure. In CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd,55
                                                                                                                                                                    
African Income Tax vol 2 memorial ed (1995) 3-7 & 8. The distinction does not, 
however, impact on the scope of this work. 
 it was held that in 
determining whether a taxpayer’s expenditure has been incurred in the 
production of income, the closeness of the connection between his expenditure 
51  ITC 1510 (1989) 54 SATC 30 36 
52  1928 AD 252 
53  At 264 
54  1975 (4) SA 177 A at 203 












and his income earning operations must be assessed with regard to, firstly the 
purpose of the expenditure, and secondly its effect. 56
In New Estate Areas Ltd v CIR,
  
57 the court held that in determining whether 
expenditure is of a capital or revenue nature, the true nature of the transaction 
must be examined, the purpose of the expenditure being an important factor.58 
In short, the court set out the test as follows: expenditure incurred for the 
purpose of establishing, improving or adding to the equipment of the income-
producing structure is capital and expenditure incurred as part of the cost of 
performing income-producing operations is revenue.59
Of further importance when discussing the nature of expenditure, is Section 
23(g) of the Act which provides that expenditure or losses are deductable to the 
extent to which they are laid out for the purpose of trade.
  
60
The classification of trading stock is also determined by the taxpayer’s intention.  
Part (a)(i) of the definition of ‘trading stock’ found in Section 1 of the Act refers 
to things produced `… for the purposes of manufacture, sale or exchange’.   
  
Part (a)(ii) which provides that things, ‘the proceeds from the disposal of which 
forms or will form part of the taxpayer’s gross income,...’ are trading stock, has 
been interpreted by the court in De Beer’s Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR,61
                                                          
56  At 299G 
 to mean 
that the taxpayer must intend to sell or dispose of the assets when he acquired 
57  1946 AD 610 
58  At 627 
59  At 627 
60  On this point, the judgments in George Forest Timber, Crowe and Baikie differ, as 
they pronounce the cost of trees not to be deductible from income despite them 
being laid out for the purpose of trade. As is explained in footnote 15, these cases 
are, however, no longer authorities on the point.  












them. In other words, that part (a)(ii) denotes futurity and not a hypothetical state 
of affairs.62
Part (b) provides for consumable stores `… to be used …’ in the course of his 
trade.  This too refers to the taxpayers intention. Clearly, the intention of the 
taxpayer in respect of items to be defined either as trading stock or not, is 
paramount. 
   
Such classification based on intention does not interfere with the law of things. 
The rules of ownership stand when the question of ownership of a thing arises, 
and the revenue/capital label of that thing for tax purposes does not change its 
ownership. Conversely, the law of ownership should not interfere with the inquiry 
in tax law as to the nature of the thing for taxation purposes.  
There is absolutely no problem in law in attaching to a tree a ‘revenue’ label, 
whilst it is rooted to ground bearing a ‘capital’ label.  Nor is there a problem in 
attaching to coal or sand that is yet to be mined ‘revenue’ for tax purposes. The 
fact that in terms of our law they are considered only one ‘res’ or ‘thing’, is 
neither here nor there. The classification does not change the inherent nature of 
the thing, it merely attaches a signpost to that thing for the purpose of taxation.  
As mentioned above, the court clearly set out in Bourke’s Estate that the 
language is merely used to describe the purpose to which it is for the time being 
appropriated. 
In my view therefore, the findings of the courts in George Forest Timber and 
Baikie are, with respect, incorrect. 
Practically, however, there are difficulties in applying the rules relating to trading 
stock to items adhered to or forming part of land. Firstly, there is a debate as to 
                                                          












the point in time at which such items become classified as revenue. Secondly, 
there can be difficulties in quantifying the trading stock to which a value has to 
be assigned for tax purposes while the stock is still attached to or inside the 
land.  These issues will now be dealt with in turn. 
3.2. Timing of classification 
 
 
The question as to the point in time at which something affixed to land becomes 
labelled ‘revenue’ for tax purposes is a complicated one. Some argue that the 
label can only be assigned at the point at which the thing is separated from the 
land. This argument seems also to be based on the finding in George Forest 
Timber that the trees are one with the land, and the obiter dictum of ... in Matla 
Coal that ‘…coal itself can only be regarded as stock-in-trade and become the 
subject matter of a sale in the course of a business once it is separated from the 
land of which it forms part, i.e. is mined.’63
With respect, I submit that it is more in-line with the principles of tax law to 
attach the labelling of a thing as revenue to the point in time at which the 
intention is formed by the taxpayer to deal with it as stock-in-trade. There is no 
compelling reason why a physical act is necessary to mark the occasion.  The 
use of separation as the defining moment is unnecessarily academic and 
artificial. It suggests that a millimetre of space between land and a grain of sand 
is physically necessary for the signposting of the sand as revenue for tax 
purposes.  
 
The view is also contrary to the finding in Bourke’s Estate that the compensation 
paid for the unfelled trees was revenue, which implies that the trees were 
classified as revenue even while rooted to the ground. 
                                                          












My view is in line with the provisions of paragraph 12(2)(c) of Schedule 8 to the 
Act which provides for the accounting adjustments to be made where a taxpayer 
changes his intention with regards to a capital asset and begins to regard it as 
trading stock. This provision seems to take as the point of departure that the 
classification of a capital asset that the taxpayer later intends to use as trading 
stock should change at the time his intention changes. 
Also, the use of separation as the defining moment can have unsatisfactory 
results. Consider a taxpayer who buys a farm on which to retire and that the 
farm has on it a well established plantation of which he is not very 
knowledgeable and intends to leave as is. Upon discovering the price that he 
could fetch should he sell the trees, he embarks on doing just that. He agrees 
with the timber merchant that the latter will fell the trees and obtain ownership of 
them on felling. On the reasoning that the trees remain capital until separation, 
the income earned by the retiree is capital in nature even though he intended to, 
and in fact did, sell the trees in terms of a scheme of profit-making using the 
trees as his stock-in-trade. On the reasoning that the trees become revenue 
from the moment at which he forms the intention to sell them for a profit, the 
income earned would be revenue.  
Schedule 1 to the Act, which regulates inter alia plantation farmers, is consistent 
with an approach of attaching the classification to intention because it provides 
that proceeds from the sale of plantations, whether sold together with the land or 
not, constitute revenue. 64 It also allows for a deduction of the cost of acquisition 
of the plantation65 as well as expenditure incurred by a plantation farmer for the 
establishment and maintenance of his plantations.66 These provisions render the 
finding in George Forest Timber inapplicable to plantation farmers. 67
                                                          
64  Paragraph 14(1)  
  
65  Paragraph 15(1)(b) 
66  Paragraph 15(1)(a) 












One view held is that, by enacting the provisions of Schedule 1 to the Act, the 
legislator acknowledged and tried to overcome the consequences of the actual 
legal position, being that the trees are capital while attached to the soil. I 
disagree and submit that the provisions merely clarify and elucidate the legal 
position, which is that the trees are revenue if they are intended by the taxpayer 
to be used as stock-in-trade. 
3.3. Quantification of trading stock adhered to land 
 
In the abstract, it seems difficult to imagine a process whereby sand to be sold 
by a farmer is quantified for purposes of recording the value of trading stock.  In 
reality, and as long as the taxpayer’s intention as to the sand he wishes to sell is 
kept in mind, this should not pose a problem. When a taxpayer forms the 
intention to begin using a capital asset for sale as his stock-in-trade, he has an 
idea of the scope of the asset that he intends selling. He would need to have 
such an idea since he would have to do a feasibility assessment, if even a 
rudimentary one, of the process of extraction/removal and transaction of sale. He 
would need to apply his mind to what exactly he wished to sell, how much of it 
there is available to extract/ remove, how much of it he would sell, the process 
whereby it would be extracted/removed from the land, the cost of 
extracting/removing it and the amount that he would receive for it. Only after 
having done so, could he decide whether it would be a financially worthwhile 
venture.  
Having followed such a process, a taxpayer should have a reasonably good idea 
of the quantity of sand or other substance that he wished to use as trading 
stock. He should record the value of the total amount of sand or other substance 
that he wishes to sell in future. He should not use only the value of trading stock 
that he intends to sell that year but the whole amount that he intends to sell in 












In De Beer’s Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CIR68 the court interpreted part (a)(ii) of the 
definition of trading stock as connoting futurity and not a hypothetical state of 
affairs.  The court held that part (a)(ii) classifies as trading stock articles 
intended to be disposed of in the future (as opposed to articles, if disposed of, 
which would constitute gross income)69
4. PRACTICAL APPLICATION 
. The taxpayer must therefore intend to 
dispose of the items in future for them to be classified as trading stock. 
 
In summary of the authorities, the taxpayer’s intention, within the context of the 
nature of his business, in respect of assets that form part of or are adhered to 
land determines their nature for tax purposes. Bearing this in mind and applying 
the hypotheses put forward above, taxpayers who intend to use part of their land 
or plants adhered to their land as trading stock should deduct the cost of 
acquisition of the things and must account for such stock as revenue as of the 
moment they form the intention to deal with it as trading stock in terms of a 
scheme of profit-making. 
Because of the provisions of Schedule 1 to the Act relating to farming, as well as 
recent judgements relating to mining, it is necessary to discuss the practical 
application of the law and my thesis in each area separately. 
4.1. Farming operations 
As mentioned briefly above, Schedule 1 to the Act, entitled ‘Computation of 
taxable income derived from pastoral or other farming operations’, sets out 
certain provisions in respect of plants adhered to land but used as trading stock. 
The provisions affect farmers who grow crops for sale as commodities as well 
as plantation farmers, both of whom grow the plants for the purpose of sale of 
the plants themselves (and not use of their fruit or use as feed to livestock). 
                                                          
68  1986 (1) SA 8 (A) 












4.1.1. Plantation farming 
 
Paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 provides that amounts received by or accrued to 
farmers in respect of the disposal of plantations, whether disposed together with 
the land or separately, are deemed not to be of a capital nature and to form part 
of the farmer’s gross income.70  The paragraph further provides a mechanism 
by means of which the proceeds of the sale of a plantation together with the land 
on which it is growing can be valued for this purpose.71
Since income from the disposal of plantations, whether disposed of together with 
or separately from the land, is deemed a receipt of a revenue nature and forming 
part of a farmer’s gross income, it is, in terms of part (a)(ii) of the definition of 
‘trading stock’, regarded as trading stock.  
 
It is not, however, accounted for in terms of Section 22 of the Act because that 
section applies only to trades ‘other than farming’. It must, therefore, be 
accounted for in terms of paragraph 3 of Schedule 1. In terms of that paragraph, 
farmers must account for ‘livestock and produce’ held and not disposed of at the 
beginning and end of each tax year.72 ‘Produce’ is not defined in the Act but is 
thought to refer to ‘crops that have ... reached the stage of being converted into 
produce having a saleable or marketable value’ and includes only growing crops 
that have been gathered and are ready for sale.73
I disagree with this argument and submit that, in line with Bourke’s Estate and 
the reasoning set out above, trees should be dealt with as trading stock as soon 
as the taxpayer forms the intention to use them as trading stock and that 
separation from the land is not necessary for their classification as such. As 
such, they should be accounted for as ‘produce’ from the point at which the 
farmer intends to sell them in terms of a scheme of profit-making. 
  
                                                          
70  Paragraph 14(1) 
71  Paragraph 14(2) 
72  Paragraph 3(1) 












4.1.2. Crop farming 
 
Schedule 1 does not provide for the classification of proceeds of the sale of 
crops whether sold together with the land or otherwise. It seems assumed that 
the proceeds of crops that are sold once removed from the land are revenue. 
Following from this, the arguments above and the provisions of paragraphs 14 
and 15 relating to plantation farmers, I submit that proceeds from the sale of 
crops sold together with the land on which they stand should be accounted for 
as revenue and the cost of establishment, maintenance or purchase of the crops 
should be a deductible expense and that the Act should be amended to cater for 
this. 
In terms of the Schedule, crop farmers must account for produce held and not 
disposed of at the beginning and end of each tax year.74
4.2. Mining 
 As mentioned above, 
crops should be dealt with as trading stock as soon as they are considered as 
trading stock by the farmer and separation from the land is not necessary for 
their classification as such. They are planted and nurtured with a view to making 
a profit from their sale and should therefore be treated as revenue. 
 
The proceeds of mining activities are revenue in nature and should form part of 
gross income. The coal, sand or other mineable substance should be classified 
as revenue from the time that the taxpayer forms the intention to deal with it as 
trading stock. As such, the Act should be amended to provide for the deduction 
of the proportionate share of the price of the land from the taxpayer’s income for 
the year in which he purchases the land on which the deposits are situated.  
The taxpayers who carry out mining activities should account for their trading 
stock in the ordinary way. Mined substances that are capable of ‘sale or 
                                                          












exchange’ upon being separated from the land, for example sand, are 
considered to fall within the definition of trading stock.  
Other substances like phosphate-bearing ore, which has to undergo a process 
whereby the phosphates are won from the soil, only becomes trading stock upon 
being so won. In order to standardise the treatment of mined substances, the 
Act should be amended by inserting the word ‘mining’ between the words 
‘manufacture,..’ and ‘sale or exchange...’. Then, all substances won from the 
soil, whether capable of sale as such or not would be treated in the same way. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Items of income and expenditure that form part of land or are adhered to land but 
used or intended to be used by the taxpayer as trading stock are revenue in 
nature and should be so labelled as of the time the taxpayer forms such 
intention. For purposes of taking into account the values of trading stock at the 
beginning and end of each fiscal year, the values should be determined with 
reference to the taxpayer’s intention with regards to the quantity of the stock. 
In order to standardise the practical application of the law, certain amendments 
to the Act are necessary. These amendments should cover the following 
aspects: 
1. Items intended to be used as trading stock should be so considered and 
accounted for as such as of the time at which such intention is formed; 
2. Amounts received by or accrued to farmers in respect of the disposal of 
crops, whether disposed together with the land or separately, should be 













3. A mechanism by means of which the proceeds of the sale of a crop 
together with the land on which it is growing can be valued should be 
provided for; 
4. Expenditure incurred by a farmer for the establishment and maintenance, 
as well as acquisition, of crops should be allowed as a deduction from 
income; 
5. The definition of trading stock should include the word ‘mining’ between 
the words ‘manufacture,..’ and ‘sale or exchange...’; 
6. Amounts received by or accrued to taxpayers engaged in mining in 
respect of the disposal of mines should be deemed not to be of a capital 
nature and to form part of the taxpayer’s gross income; 
7. A mechanism by means of which the proceeds of the sale of a mine 
together with the land in which it is located can be valued should be 
provided for; and 
8. Expenditure incurred by a taxpayer engaged in mining for the 
establishment and maintenance, as well as acquisition, of mines should 
be allowed as a deduction from income. 
These amendments would clarify the legal position for taxpayers in the affected 
fields and ensure that our tax law is not burdened by rules that are neither 
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